I. Foreword
After two weeks' conference in Peiping, the puppet Chinese Communist regime and Soviet Russia issued a series of eight joint communiques on October 12, 1954. Three of the eight communiques are concerned with communications, the gist of which follows:
1. Port Arthur to be restored to the puppet regime after the withdrawal of Soviet troops;
2. Construction and joint operation of the Lanchow-Tihua-Hochen railroad to be connected with the Turk-Sib railway at Alma Ata;
3. Construction and joint operation of the Tsining-Ulan Bator railroad to be connected with the Trans-Siberian railway at Ulan Ude.
As regards the first item, a Sino-Russian joint committee was to be set up to run the administration of Port Arthur after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Like other Russian advisors now working on the mainland of China, Russian members on this joint committee will eventually be in full control. The committee will function nominally, without any actual power. In the following paragraphs, the writer will discuss the implications of Soviet Russia's strategic control over the railroads on the Chinese mainland through the construction of the two projected railroads as mentioned in items 2 and 3.
II. The Lanchow-Hochen Railroad
This railrod is in reality an extension of the Lunghai railway, which is 1760 kilometres long from Lienyun Harbor to Lanchow. The section between Lienyun and Tienshui with a length of 1382 kilometres was opened to traffic during the Sino-Japanese War, while the difficult earth work of the remaining 378 kilometres was completed before the Communist occupation of the mainland in 1949. The Communists have since made some modifications of the projected line, shortening its distance to 347 kilometres. The Tienshui-Lancbow section was opened to traffic on October 1, 1952. Immediately afterwards, the construction of the Lanchow-Hochen section began. At the end of 1953, it reached Wuhsiao Divide, about 200 kilometres west of Lanchow.
The section between Lanchow and Hami is about 1500 kilometres, running westward into the Hosi Corridor and passing through Yungten, Wuhsiao Divide, Wuwei, Chiuchuan, Yumen and Ansi. Between Hami and Tihua there are two routes, north and south of the Tienshan mountains respectively. The north route is shorter and is technically easier for construction, while the south route, totalling 586 kilometres, is considered economically more valuable. Between Tihua and Wusu, the line follows in the main the highway trunk line, with a total length of 270 kilometres. Technically speaking, there is no difficulty either. Both Yumen and Wusu oil fields are situated along this section, and Wusu is historically an important strategic point in Northwest China.
Westward from Wusu, the line develops into a fork. The northwest route stretches via Tachen to Serkerflo (Semirrietshensk) in the U.S.S.R. to connect the Turk-Sib railway. The southwest route stretches to Alma Ata via Hochen to connect also the Turk-Sib railway. The entire distance between Lanchow and the nearest junction on the Turk-Sib line is about 2800 kilometres.
On October 16, 1954, President Chiang told an American correspondent that barring intervening obstacles, the Lanchow-Hochen railway might be completed with forced labor in the summer of 1956. When this 4000-kilometre railway between Lienyun Harbor and the nearest junction on the Turk-Sib railway is completed, its economic implications are as important as its strategic considerations. It is the only railroad connecting the northwest and the southeast of China, running through Sinkiang, Kansu, Shensi, Honan and Kiangsu provinces. Agricultural and mineral resources as well as livestock products, which are abundant in these five provinces, will be at the disposal of Soviet Russia. Therefore, when the Lanchow-Hochen Railroad is completed, Soviet Russia will have a short-cut to the Pacific Ocean. She will also have a tighter grip over the Yellow River Valley and the seaboard provinces through the control of the existing railroad systems such as the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow railways.
The construction of two other new railroads, namely, the Lanchow-Kunming line and the Kunming-Lashio (Burma) line has also been started by the Chinese Communists. When these two railroads are completed, the Soviets will reach as far as Haiphong, and Siagon in Indo-China and Rangoon in Burma, well penetrating into Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.
III. The Tsining-Ulan Bator Railroad
Of this railroad the section between Ulan Ude (on the Trans-Siberian Railway) and Ulan Bator has been built by the Russians, while the section between Ulan Bator and Tsining with a length of 1200 kilometres has, according to the joint communiques, been under construction since September 1952 and is scheduled to be completed in 1955. The military significance of this railroad is far greater than its economic significance, because along the line there are many deserts and pastures. When this rail road is completed, it will connect Ulan Ude with the Peiping-Suiyuan and Peiping Mukden railways. Then all southbound railways in China will be dovetailed into Soviet Russia's strategic plan. First, the Russians can reach Canton from Tsining via the Peiping-Hankow and Hankow-Canton railways. Secondly, they can reach Shanghai and Canton from Tsining via the Peiping-Mukden, Tientsin-Pukow, Nanking-Shanghai, Chekiang-Kiangsi, and Hankow-Canton railways. Thirdly, they can reach Sian and Canton from Tsining via the Peiping-Suiyuan, Tungpu, Lunghai, Peiping-Hankow and Hankow-Canton railways. Of the above three systems, the first is considered the best, because it is the shortest and not so exposed to the seaboard.
Except in the Northeastern Provinces, railroads are scattered over the seaboard provinces of China, but not systematically. During the Sino-Japanese War, fragments of new railways were built in the southwestern provinces, again not systematically. When the two projected railroads are completed, there will be quite a new look of communications not only in China but also throughout the Eurasian continent. This will affect the whole situation in the following aspects:
1. Aside from Vladivostok, Port Arthur and Darien, Lienyun Harbour will be closely attached to Russia. Being strategically important, Lienyun will become a second Vladivostok.
2. By means of the Trans-Siberian and Turk-Sib railways, the Russians can control the whole Chinese mainland through the latter's existing railroads. There are three major systems of these railroads. The outer one is the Changchun railway; the middle one is the Tsining-Ulan Bator railway; and the inner one is the Lanchow-Hochen railway. These three lines amount to what the Chinese proverb calls "three dens of a cunning rabbit". Even in the event of the resumption of the Korean War, in which case the Allied forces might cross the Yalu River to cut the Changchun railway, or in the event of our counter-attack on the Chinese mainland, thereby rendering North and East China untenable to the Communists, the Russians still can depend on the inner route for a prolonged resistance. This was well explained by President Chiang on October 16, 1954:
"As long as the Russians can control the heartland of the Eurasian continent, they will be able to stand the threat both from the air and the sea, and will be in a position to defend themselves or to launch an attack under any circumstance."
3. By consolidating their position in Sinkiang, Mongolia and the Northeastern Provinces in China as well as in Central Asia and Siberia, and by further integrating the whole Chinese mainland with Russia, the Russians will be in an excellent strategic position. They can strike at any direction — the Arctic Sea in the north, Southwest Europe in the west, the Indian Ocean in the south and the Pacific Ocean in the east.
4. The Russians can despatch their armed forces to the mainland of China by joint operation of these railroads, and also they can utilize Chinese manpower and resources for any emergencies in the Middle East and Southeast Europe. The almost inexhaustible manpower of China will certainly be used by International Communism as cannon fodder once war breaks out in Asia or in Europe. It would be most tragic should the democratic world overlook Russia's strategic planning for the development of railways on the Chinese mainland.
IV. An Aggressive Tradition
It is not an accidental coincidence that the USSR should plan to control railroads on the Chinese mainland; it is the inevitable outcome of their aggressive tradition coupled with the Chinese Communists' traitorous behavior. A reading of Russian history convinces us that it is a history of aggression. From Ivan the Terrible (1530-1584), who unified all Russian principalities into a state, down to Peter the Great (1672-1725), Russia for many times invaded its neighboring countries such as Sweden, Poland, Persia and Turkey. Russia had for many times trespassed on the boundary lines of China. Peter the Great even arrogantly said that Russia should establish bases along the Pacific coast. He died in 172 5, but in his will the blueprint of aggression was laid down. Peter the Great has been viewed as the First Bolshevist by the Russian Communists.
Peter's plan has been closely followed by his successors, including the Communists. Such are the important points of the plan: "Russia should be kept in a perpetual war condition; to take an offensive at an opportune time, with expansion as the sole objective. Internal disturbances should be engineered in Poland. Polish nobilities should be bought over to serve Russia. Portions of Polish territory might be apportioned to any neighboring country which might raise any objection to Russia's expansionist policy. Discord should be created between Sweden and Finland so as to seize as much Swedish territory as possible. Russia should expand northward around the Baltic Sea and southward around the Black Sea. World hegemony would be gained through the conquest of Turkey and India. Russia should first wage war against Turkey and then extend her influence toward the Persian Gulf. Then Russia should try to advance toward India. Rebellious elements from Hungary and Poland should be sheltered. After all the above-mentioned conquests had been made, suggestion should be made to Germany and France for the partition of the world. Should one accept the Russian proposal, Russia should join force with her for the destruction of the other, which should also be liquidated later…. " In the last 300 years since Peter's death, there have been changes in the government of Russia, but there has been no change in those fundamental policies. Rather the implementation of these policies has been getting momentum under the Communist regime. The Russian slogan is World Revolution, which means the Russian rule of the entire world with Moscow as the capital.
As Russia has no good outlets to the sea, her expansionist policy also aims at seeking good harbors in the warm zone. After her defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), her adventures were directed to the Far East. A Russian official said as early as 1858 that the Pacific Ocean would be another Mediterranean Sea in the future, and that Siberia was destined to play an important role for Russia. Only three years after the Crimean War, Russia occupied Vladivostok and established a naval base there. Then followed a series of aggressive activities against China with the objective of roping off Manchuria, Hopei, Shensi, Shansi, Kansu, and Sinkiang as Russia's sphere of influence. The Finance Minister of the then Czarist government even made such remarks in his memoirs: "It is a matter of time that Manchuria will be ours and the map color of the Chinese Empire will be changed into that of Russia." Although Russia's ambition in the Far East was first checked in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the Russians have never changed their aggressive policy. The Communists are carrying out Peter's program of world con quest with even greater speed and fury.
V. Conclusion
In discussing the land power, Mr. H. J. Mackinder said that geographic features had set a definite pattern for history. He further asserted that the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa constituted a "World Island" and that whoever controlled this "World Island" would control the world. Modern strategists are skeptical of this theory by arguing that space alone is not necessarily an absolute source of strength. Take, for example, the Great Mongol Empire which was as big as the USSR, but which collapsed just because of its immense size of territory.
The situation, however, has begun to change, and the change comes from the building of the two Chinese railways linking the USSR. If the tactics to operate on interior lines is not abandoned, the superiority of immense territory still prevails. The network of communications of Russia is comparatively developed in its European portion, while in Asia and the Middle East it is rather backward. As communications are pivotal to operations on interior lines, Russia has lagged behind in this respect. Now this backwardness will be remedied by the construction of these two new railroads. This strategic significance is likely to be overlooked by those who emphasize the superiority of air or sea power to that of land. But let us not be blind to the historical fact that the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway in 1903 was followed in the next year by the Russo-Japanese War. The status of communications is always a decisive factor in war. If the statesmen of the democratic world refuse to take a lesson in this, then the consequences will be serious. President Chiang reminded us on October 17, 1954 when he told a British correspondent: "If the democratic countries wait and see the Communists to achieve their strategic control over the railroads on the Chinese mainland, then the third world war will become inevitable, when the two new railroads are completed."